// Blog / News

The vendor you stopped using still had the keys

Share

Between October 14 and 26, an attacker holding IAM credentials tied to Qubole's AWS account used them to assume customer integration roles, then harvested secrets and data. The detail that makes this worth your time: most of the roles the attacker assumed were dormant. Nobody was using them. Each one still trusted Qubole's account, so the requests succeeded.

What they got

Having assumed those roles, the attacker pulled Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager entries and SSM parameters, ran the results through a secret-scanning tool to find what was live, and copied data out of S3 buckets. Among what surfaced were Microsoft Entra ID service-principal secrets and Okta client credentials, which were then tested against those identity services.

Follow that chain, because it is the whole lesson. A dormant trust in a cloud account led to stored secrets, and those secrets led to the identity provider that controls logins everywhere else. The starting point was a connection nobody was using any more.

Per Wiz, no AWS flaw was involved. The trust relationship itself was the weakness. Nothing was broken; something was simply still switched on.

The pattern we keep arriving at

This is the third version of the same problem in a month, and the repetition is the point.

In October an attacker signed in to 173 Microsoft 365 tenants as a backup application, inheriting permissions customers had granted and never revisited. We followed it with a guide on auditing what can reach your tenant. Now the same shape appears on the cloud side: a vendor's trust, granted once, surviving the relationship that justified it.

The common thread is not a vendor failing. It is that access outlives usage, by default, everywhere, because nothing in any of these systems expires a permission when you stop using the tool. You cancelled the subscription, the trial ended, the project finished, the integration was replaced. The trust stayed.

What to actually do

  • If you use Qubole or ever did, review CloudTrail from October 1 onward in any account holding a Qubole role, delete roles you no longer need, or remove Qubole's account from the trust policy. Rotate anything those roles could have reached.
  • Make the list that applies regardless of vendor: every third party with standing access to your cloud, your Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, and your line-of-business systems. Then mark the ones you are not actively using.
  • Revoke on exit, not on review. Add one line to however you end a vendor relationship: remove their access. That is the fix for this entire category, and it belongs with closing a vendor account properly.
  • Stop storing long-lived secrets where an integration can read them. If a role can read your secret store, it can read your other providers' credentials too, which is how this jumped from AWS to Entra and Okta.
  • Scope trust narrowly when you grant it. A read-everything policy is easy to set up and impossible to contain later. Worth pushing back on a vendor's suggested defaults.
  • Diary a quarterly twenty minutes to look at the list. The value is having a baseline so you can see what changed.

What is uncertain

Scale is disputed: Sentra reported more than a dozen organizations affected, while Wiz's account refers to three customer accounts. Wiz's primary write-up was not something we could retrieve directly, so the victim count here is secondhand. The claim that Qubole's own setup documentation suggested an S3 policy granting read access to every bucket also comes from secondary reporting rather than from Wiz. The core mechanism, dormant roles still trusting the vendor's account, is consistent across every source.

The takeaway

The uncomfortable thing about this one is that no small business did anything wrong to be exposed to it. They connected a tool, which is what tools are for, and then stopped using it, which is normal. The gap is that nothing revoked the access on their behalf. Writing down who has standing access, and deleting it when a relationship ends, is unglamorous administrative work that keeps turning out to be the actual control.

Sources:The RegisterGBHackers

Could you list every third party with standing access to your systems, and say which ones you still use? We help small businesses build that list and revoke what is left over.

Talk to us

Related